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Statistical studies are hardly needed to prove the existence of immense material
inequality between human beings. It is evident to anyone who walks down the street in
most major cities or watches a television newscast which jumps from images of famine
in Angola to the business or the football transfer news. This article takes the existence
of great inequality as given but discusses the various ways in which that inequality can
be and is measured and surveys evidence about how inequality on a world scale has
evolved during the last century and especially since 1980.
1. Partial evidence about the poor and the rich
According to the World Bank’s frequently quoted figures, 56 percent of the world’s
population were living below the poverty line of $2 a day in 1998. This estimate is based
on household surveys conducted between 1985 and 1998, the results being compared
using purchasing power parity prices of 1993 and the figures updated in accordance
with aggregate consumption figures. This means that in countries where income has
become more unequally distributed this method will underestimate the number of poor
people (and vice versa). The latest calculations estimate that both the poverty and the
extreme poverty ($1 a day) rate have fallen during the years 1987–1998 (from 61 per
cent to 56 per cent and from 28 to 23 per cent respectively) but that the absolute
numbers of poor people grew during this period by about 260 millions (World Bank
2001). While the Bank’s estimates are evidence that poverty is the norm for around half
of the world’s population it is not easy to use them in the form in which they are
published. This is because they do not give estimates of incomes but only of the
numbers of people living below a given level of income; and they provide no information
about the incomes of those who are not poor. The kind of household survey data on
which they are based, however, will be seen later in this article to play a central role in
reaching quantitative estimates of inequality on a world scale.
We know less about the very rich and their income. This is partly because they are able
to hide their wealth and partly because fewer research resources are devoted to
studying extreme wealth since it is not officially regarded as socially pathological. In
some countries, however, surveys of the relative incomes of the rich have been
conducted. In the United States, for instance, it is estimated that between 1960 and
1999 the average real pay of chief executive officers of large corporations rose by 11
times while that of real production workers remained almost unchanged (Sutcliffe 2001,
derived from data on EPI website). Forbes magazine and various other publications
regularly list the very wealthy of the world and a group of financial companies has
recently started to produce an annual World Wealth Report (Merrill Lynch and Cap
Gemini Ernst & Young 2002). While this estimates that in the year 2001 there were 7.1
million people in the world with assets of more than one million dollars (‘high net-worth
individuals’ or HNWIs) and that these owned $26.2 trillion in assets, it provides no
estimates of their incomes. Such information contributes even less to estimating the
overall worldwide distribution of income than that the available information on the poor.
Yet, when we place such disparate information together, although it is only a few pieces
of the jigsaw, a picture of extreme and possibly rising inequality is suggested. Facts of
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this kind have fed a conviction, almost universal among journalists and political critics of
the status quo that world inequality has recently (especially during the years of
neoliberal ‘globalization’ since, say, 1980) been rising fast and has reached
unprecedented levels. Yet at the same time, with few exceptions, the opinion of most
academic economists who have carried out quantitative studies of the question is that
the opposite has occurred and that recent decades have been ones of diminishing world
inequality. Is this a difference based on misunderstanding, on different conceptual
visions, or on differences about the facts and how to interpret them? This article seeks
to clarify these questions by looking at the figures, their types and sources and then to
see how much the differences are apparent or real.
Another kind of more general information has also helped to convey the impression that
world inequality has grown and is growing: estimates of the income or product per head
of individual countries of groups of countries. The three following graphs show the level
of GDP per head, measured at purchasing power parity (the significance of which will
be discussed later) for continents or parts of continents relative to the figure for the
world: Figure 1, derived from the recent work of Angus Maddison, is for the years 1820
to 1998 (with an expansion of the scale of the graph after 1950); and Figure 2 (using
World Bank statistics) shows more detail for the years 1980 to 2000. There have
evidently been many phases in the continental patterns of equality and inequality; up to
1900 Western Europe’s rise in relation to the world level was not nearly as fast as that
of North America; Southern Europe and Latin America remained at the same relative
level and the rest of the world deteriorated. From 1900 to 1950 Western Offshoots
(USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) continued to surge ahead, Western and
Southern Europe fell back, Latin America and Eastern Europe rose; after 1950 Southern
and Western Europe and later Asia rose fast while Latin America and later more
precipitately Eastern Europe fell back. North America relatively fell back as other
countries recovered from the war but since the mid 1970s (despite much talk of a
general economic crisis) it has resumed its relative rise, ending the century at a
historical maximum.
What is constant is that for two centuries Africa’s position relative to the world has
worsened. The ratio between the income per head of the Western Offshoots (North
America plus Australasia) in 1820 and of Africa is calculated at about 2.6 to 1; after 2
centuries of continuous fall it had by 1980 reached 12 to 1 and by 1998 almost 20 to 1.
It is not surprising that there is a common perception of growing inequality. Nor is it
wrong since these figures are strongly suggestive of the growth of world inequality in
general as well as equalities between particular continents or countries.
This paper is mainly concerned not with such particular inequalities but with the
question of whether, by using available economic statistics, it is possible to obtain an
overall assessment of the degree of world inequality and say definitively how it has
changed. Some systematic comparison of recent estimates is needed as a guide to an
increasingly studied subject which must produce great confusion in an uninitiated reader
who sees some of the statements in the two lists in Box 1, most of them taken from
academic studies or from international organization sources generally regarded as
authoritative.
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The apparent inconsistency of these two lists has three causes: the use of different
concepts of what equality and inequality are; the way in which those concepts should be
measured; and inconsistencies in data obtained from different sources. In the hope of
clearing the ground of all this undergrowth, this paper proposes to outline the problems
of method, measurement and data in assessing the movement of global inequality. It
then surveys and compares a considerable number of existing studies and adds its own
additional calculations in the hope of clarifying the differences and of suggesting some
new lines for research. It ends by commenting on the ideological and political meaning
of the debate.

Figure 1a. Income levels relative to the world average 1820–1998
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Figure 1b: Income levels relative to the world, 1980–2000
4
OECD
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5

Latin America

Eastern Europe

1
Middle East
0.5
0
1980

East Asia
South Asia Subsaharan Africa
1990

2000

Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank, World Development Indicators 2002, online edition

6

Box 1: Convergence or divergence: some recent opinions
“The evidence strongly suggests that global income inequality has risen in the last twenty years. The standards
of measuring this change, and the reasons for it, are contested but the trend is clear.”
Robert Wade (“Inequality of World Incomes: What Should be Done?”)
“The dramatic advance of globalization and neoliberalism … has been accompanied by an explosive growth in
inequality …”
Ignacio Ramonet (Le Monde Diplomatique May 1998)
“… poverty and inequality have grown alongside the expansion of globalization. In a world of disturbing
contrasts, the gap between the rich and poor countries and between rich and poor people continues to widen.”
Kevin Watkins (Background paper for UNDP, Human Development Report 1999)
“Gaps in income between the poorest and the richest countries have continued to widen. In 1960 the 20% of the
world’s people in the richest countries had 30 times the income of the poorest 20% in 1997, 74 times as much.
This continues the trend of two centuries.” (UNDP, Human Development Report 1999, Ch.1, p. 36)
“In 1960 per capita GDP in the richest 20 countries was 18 times that in the poorest 20 countries. By 1995 this
gap had widened to 37 times, a phenomenon often referred to as divergence... Such figures indicate that income
inequality between countries has increased sharply over the past 40 years.” (World Bank, World Development
Report 2000/2001, Ch. 3 p. 51)
“The gap between the rich and poor nations is now at its highest ever level”. (Richard Jolly, Global Inequality,
Wider Angle, December 1999)
********
“...world wide divergence in per capita GDP increased steadily from the beginning of the century to the early
1980s. A turning point occurs, however, around 1980. The more rapid growth rates of India and, especially,
China in more recent years have led to some modest convergence.” (A. Boltho and G. Toniolo, "The
Assessment: The Twentieth Century: Achievements, Failures, Lessons", Oxford Review of Economic Policy,
Vol 15, No.4)
“Roughly speaking, the peak of world inequality was reached in the middle of the 20th Century after more than
a century of continuous divergence. Since then, and in comparison with such a dramatic evolution, changes
observed during the last 50 years look minor ones and the situation would seem to be stabilizing.” (F.
Bourguignon and Christian Morrisson, “Inequality among world citizens: 1820 1990”, draft February 2001).
“…we estimated nine measures of global income inequality. All of them deliver the same picture: inequality
declined substantially during the last two decades.”
(Xavier Sala i Martin, The World Distribution of Income (estimated from individual country distributions),
NBER Working Paper 8933)
“When international inequality is appropriately measured on the basis of purchasing power parity (adjusting for
different price levels) rather than official exchange rates, and countries are weighted according to the size of
their populations, plausible measures of international inequality indicate that income convergence has taken
place since the late 1960s.” (Arne Melchior, Global Income Inequality: beliefs, facts and unresolved issues,
World Economics, Vol 2 No 3 July September 2001)
"…the evidence suggests that the increases in world wide inequality in recent years are small relative to the
much larger increases that occurred during the 19th century". (World Bank, World Development Report
2000/2001)
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2. What to measure: integral measures versus ratios of groups
Two common ways of looking at world distribution (or any distribution for that matter)
are to compare the extremes of the distribution (the ratio of the incomes of the rich to
the incomes of the poor), or to use all the data and produce an integral measure of
distribution, of which the Gini coefficient is by far the most widely used. Both these
methods can be used to calculate either distribution which takes into account only the
differences between countries (referred to here as inter-country distribution) or
distribution which also takes into account differences within countries (referred to here
as global distribution). This gives us the four possible approaches to world distribution
shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Different concepts of world distribution
Integral measure

Ratio of extremes

Inter-country

A

C

Global

B

D

Is an integral measure better than a ratio of extremes? The ratio of extremes has the
advantage that it can be understood much more intuitively while integral measures,
such as the Gini coefficient, are more abstract and require more explanation. On the
other hand the ratio of extremes only compares two parts of the available data and so at
best can give a limited view of the distribution. Measures of the ratio of extremes can in
some cases use all the available data (for instance by measuring the ratio of the income
of the top to that of the bottom half of the population, sometimes called the Robin Hood
index); but even this gives no more than a relation of two summary figures. On the other
hand the ratio of extremes may be a better approximation to the level of social justice
than integral measures. This point can be illustrated with an example: suppose that we
observe the following levels of income per head by quintiles of the same population in
years 1 and 2.
Table 2: A hypothetical example of two distributions
Quintile I
Quintile II
Quintile III
Distribution 1
1
1
1
Distribution 2
1
16
16

Quintile IV
1
16

Quintile V
15
16

Which of these two distributions is more egalitarian? In this example, which, as we shall
see, is not too far removed from some aspects of world reality, the two types of
measure give completely different answers. In Distribution 2 shows a higher ratio of
extremes (the top divided by the bottom quintile) and so greater inequality than
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Distribution 2 (16 to 1 as opposed to 15 to 1). The Gini coefficient, however, shows a
spectacular reduction in inequality, falling from 0.589 to 0.185.
There could be a long debate about which of these distributions shows more social
justice. But it is at least arguable that a society where four fifths of the people were rich
and one fifth poor is morally worse than one where four fifths are poor and one fifth is
rich. This is on the grounds that the exclusion of a small minority in conditions of general
plenty is worse than great riches for a few amid general poverty, since only in the first
case could everyone be made comfortable with only a small amount of redistribution. In
other words, extreme poverty can be considered more unjust in a generally rich than in
a generally poor society.
This point is not just a formality but, as will be seen later, is relevant to the interpretation
of the conclusions about the course of income distribution during the last century. It
suggests that it would be wise to look at both kinds of measures in order to judge the
changes in equality and inequality.
3. How to compare incomes: exchange rates versus purchasing power parity
A very large amount of the disagreement and confusion about what has been
happening to world income inequality has been due to the fact that two different ways of
comparing the incomes of different countries are in common use – the exchange rate
method and the purchasing power parity method. They both start from the same income
figures, taken from the national accounts or from household surveys or other sources.
These are, of course, in the first instance in national currencies. For countries to be
compared, and world calculations made, they must be converted to a common
currency. This has traditionally been done by converting them via the ruling exchange
rate to dollars. The problem with this is that, as nearly everyone accepts, exchange
rates very often fail to reflect equivalence of purchasing power. A person from one
country going to another and changing currency will often find his or her purchasing
power increased or reduced. The exchange rate-converted figures for income,
therefore, produce false comparisons. The general solution proposed is the use of
purchasing power parity, a calculation, based on an exhaustive exploration of prices in
different countries, of what is the real equivalence of a quantity of one currency when
converted to another. In practice, it appears that countries whose exchange rate
underestimates purchasing power are mostly poor countries and those with the opposite
characteristic are mostly rich countries. This means that when calculations are made
using ppp the numerical measure of inequality between the richer and poorer countries
tends to be lessened. In principle, however, this is a real comparison of material living
standards which the figures converted with exchange rates are not. The ppp method is,
therefore, overwhelmingly favoured by economists. It enables income levels between
counties (over space) to be compared in the same way that in each country adjustment
for inflation produces real figures which can be compared over time. This space and
time comparability constitutes the great breakthrough of ppp figures which have recently
become available in abundance.
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The difference in methods produces enormous differences in calculations about
inequality, as shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Calculated world inequality in 2000
Measure
1. Inter-country Gini coefficient 2000 ppp (163 countries)
2. Inter-country 5%/5% ratio 2000
3. Inter-country 10%/10% ratio 2000
4. Inter-country 20%/20% ratio 2000
5. Inter-country 50%/50% ratio 2000

ppp
0.543
47.95
31.37
15.99
5.38

exchange
rate
0.753
175.31
126.08
67.03
20.09

Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2002 online version. The exchange rate conversion
uses the World Bank’s Atlas method (using exchange rates averaged over a year).

These figures are all based on the same 163 countries (the maximum for which the
quoted source gives both exchange rate based and purchasing power parity based
estimates of income). So the two columns show only the difference produced by the
type of income conversion used. The exchange rate converted figures used are those
described by the World Bank as the Atlas method, in which the exchange rate used is
an average for the year rather than the rate on a particular date. Comparing the two
columns it is obvious that the exchange rate method gives much higher measures of
inequality than the ppp method, although of course the reality they are attempting to
describe is identical. The Gini coefficient is nearly half as high again and the ratios of
the extremes show indices of inequality around 4 times greater than the ppp method. In
addition, as shown in Table 4, when observed over time the two methods give very
different results. In general over the past two decades the exchange rate method shows
the level of world inequalty rising and the ppp method shows it falling. Later some
exceptions and nuances to this generalization will be discussed but for now the figures
in Table 4 show a very simple calculation based this time on 113 countries (those which
have data for both dates) to clarify the problem. Not only is the exchange rate based
Gini higher in both years but it rises from 1980 to 2000 indicating greater inequality
while the ppp based Gini falls indicating greater equality. This fundamental difference is
the result only of the difference in the basis of conversion since the basic data are the
same in both cases.
Exchange rate figures do not necessarily give higher values for the level and growth of
inequality. The basic reason for the differences shown in Tables 3 and 4 is that
exchange rates in poor countries have tended to be undervalued in foreign exchange
markets in relation to their domestic purchasing power (a phenomenon well known to
tourists). In addition during the years 1980 to 2000 the relative undervaluation in many
poor countries increased and the relative overvaluation of the all important currency of
the USA also tended to increase. In very recent times, however, the renewed fall in the
international value of the dollar and a slower rate of devaluation in many poorer
countries has done something to reverse the trends observed.
10

Table 4. Changes in Gini coefficient 1980–2000, exchange rate and ppp methods
of comparison
1980
2000

Exchange rate (Atlas)
ppp (World Bank)
0.7053
0.7449

0.6137
0.5422

Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank, World Economic Indicators 2002, online edition; the
same 113 countries are common to all four calculations.

Since they give very different levels of inequality and opposite trends it is obviously of
fundamental importance to decide which method is correct. It seems completely clear
that in principal the correct measurement for comparing living standards (and so the real
levels of international inequality) is given by the ppp method. This is based on the
conversion of incomes using an index (a kind of shadow exchange rate) calculated on
the basis of detailed comparison of the price levels of the same commodities between
countries. In this way the effect of changes in exchange rates on the apparent
distribution of world income is eliminated in a similar way to that in which comparisons
between dates are made real by adjustment for price differences over time. So in
principle the ppp figures allow a matrix in which the figure for the income per head of
each country over time is comparable both vertically (over time) and horizontally (over
space), in other words the figures are both temporally and spatially real. Since the
measurement of inequality is concerned with real differences in living standards this is
surely the correct procedure. Nearly all writers on the subject accept this; indeed it is the
recent multiplication of ppp income estimates which has permitted the rise in the
analysis of world income disparities. A few writers nonetheless claim that exchange rate
conversions produce a more accurate picture of relative economic power which
countries can only obtain by converting their undervalued currencies into high valued
currencies (for example, to spend on renting an office in New York or Geneva from
which to lobby international organizations).This argument may have some small merit in
relation to the international power of countries but has none in relation to the
measurement of inequality in the standard of living. Most use of exchange rate based
calculations of world inequality, however, are not based on such arguments but on an
desire to produce a particular result. This will be discussed further but in the meantime it
should be made clear that from now on all calculations made and referred to in this
paper use ppp methods. These methods, however, have their own problems.
4. Different sources of ppp income data
All ppp estimates of incomes come ultimately, though not directly, from the same source
– the International Comparisons Program, a joint venture of the United Nations and the
Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (for more details
see http://www.worldbank.org/data/icp). The estimates are made by converting
conventional national accounts figures in national currencies to international prices,
established through price surveys (revised every three years) currently in 118 countries.
The purpose of the exercise is to eliminate the price variations between countries for
11

equivalent products and services and so make the value of these comparable between
countries.
If in principle ppp converted figures are much better reflections of real differences in
living standards, in practice there are three separate sources of ppp estimates which
are by no means identical. One of these is from the World Bank data bank, World
Development Indicators (WDI), the second from the latest version (number 6) of the
Penn World Tables, produced by Heston, Summers and Aten and their colleagues
(PWT6.1) and the third produced by Angus Maddison working under the auspices of the
OECD (Maddison 2001).
The work of Maddison and of Heston and Summers and their associates, in producing a
continuous series of figures for income per head (and other variables) since distant
dates and in figures which are in principle comparable over both time and space is what
has made possible a debate on the history of distribution between countries.
Maddison’s data begin in 1820 for some countries and have recently been updated to
1998 for most countries, while Heston and Summers’ series for a growing number of
countries covers the period from 1950 to 1998. The World Bank’s ppp data begin in
1975.
While all three estimates use the price data produced by the World Comparisons
Project, they adjust in various ways so that considerable differences emerge between
the different estimates. As we shall see, the differences are great enough to imply
different conclusions about the recent course of movement of world inequality.
Each person or group who has analysed the basic ppp data has added his or her own
eccentricities. To take a single case which is bound to have major effects of
international calculations, that of China: between 1980 and 1990 the real income per
head of China, measured at ppp, increased by 36 percent according to the Penn World
Tables version 5.6, 63 per cent according to the Penn World Tables version 6, by 85 per
according to Maddison’s 1995 study and by 70 per cent according to Maddison’s 2001
revision; it is not possible to give a comparative figure for the World Development
Indicators since it gives the data only in current prices. In the face of differences of that
degree about the second largest economy in the world it is evident that any conclusions
must be treated with extreme caution. Where possible, different estimates should be
tested to see the degree of robustness of the conclusions to different versions of the
income data. I have tried to do this in most of my later calculations.
Table 5 gives some details of the differences between estimates made by the three
sources. For Maddison 2001 and PWT6.1 I have taken the 92 countries for which both
versions have estimates, and almost the same group of countries for the World
Development Indicators; to make them comparable the figures for all countries have
been normalized as a proportion of the estimate for the USA (since the Maddison 2001
and PWT6.1 base years are different and WDI is in current prices). The comparisons
between them appear in Table 5. This shows large enough variations between the three
sources to feed doubts about the use of these figures.
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Table 5: Variability of estimates of GDP per head, 1998
PWT6.1–Madd2001
Madd2001–WDI2002
PWT6.1–WDI2002

% within 10%
45.7
34.4
48.9

range of difference %
62–291
36–326
70–202

Based on figures for 1998 in each case for about 90 countries; the countries
used in each comparison are the same for both measures compared
Source: Author’s calculations based on Maddison 2001 and Heston, Summers and Aten 2002 and World
Bank 2002

The first column shows the percentage of the country income estimates of the second
mentioned source which are within 10 percent (above or below) of the country estimates
of the first mentioned source (so, for example, only 45 percent of the Maddison 2001
values are within 10 percent of the PWT values); the second column shows the range of
the country estimates of the second mentioned source as a percentage of the first (so,
for example, the Maddison 2001 values vary between 62 percent and 291 percent of the
PWT values). These divergences seem very large indeed.
Table 6: Comparing Gini coefficients produced by 3 income sources

1980
1990
1998

PWT6.1
Gini
0.582
0.563
0.523

countries
92
92
92

Maximum number of countries
1950
0.523
53
1973
0.591
115
1990
0.564
134
1998
0.519
140

Maddison 2001
Gini
countries
0.587
92
0.569
92
0.539
92
0.551
0.574
0.569
0.564

198
217
219
219

WDI 2002
Gini
0.618
0.587
0.542

countries
87
90
90

n.a.
*0.612
0.577
0.543
* figures for 1975

n.a.
*117
161
167

Note: in the case of PWT6.1 and WDI 2002 the rising number of countries reflects the existence of data
for an increasing number of countries. In the case of Maddison the data is for the same countries which
change in number due to political changes (fusions and breakups)
Source: author’s calculations based on Heston, Summers and Aten 2001, Maddison 2001 and World
Bank 2002

The three sources produce estimates of the Gini coefficient which are rather closer than
the differences in estimates of individual countries’ GDP per head might suggest. This is
partly because many of the biggest differences are for small and poor countries and
because some of the differences cancel each other out. The upper half of Table 6
13

compares the Gini coefficients given by the three sources using the same 92 countries
for PWT6.1 and Maddison 2001 and nearly the same for the WDI. The differences in the
Gini coefficients are surely small enough to be within any reasonable margins of error.
All three show a falling Gini coefficient for the years 1980 to 2000 and the differences
are not large; it is significant, as we shall see, that Maddison 2001 shows the lowest fall
in the coefficient. When the calculation is made not for the same group of countries in
each case but for the maximum for which they respectively provide estimates in the
years 1950 to 1988 the differences are more striking. The result is shown in the lower
half of the table. Both PWT6.1 and WDI still show a falling Gini coefficient (that is, falling
inequality) but Maddison 2001 shows scarcely any fall at all. These calculations are
done here merely to illustrate the differences in the data. Later we shall see that the
difference is significant for conclusions about world inequality.
5. Inter-country versus global distribution
An obvious limitation of all the results mentioned in the previous section is that they only
estimate distribution between countries as a whole (weighted, of course, by
populations). They do not take into account the distribution of income within countries.
This is like considering the whole world as a single economic unit and I refer to such a
concept as global (as opposed to inter-country) distribution. It is evident that the
objective of studies of world distribution must be to produce global and not inter-country
estimates. We can hardly be confident in information about the world which assumes
that 1,200 million Chinese citizens, or 280 millions US citizens receive respectively
identical incomes. Gini coefficients are always larger when internal distribution is taken
into account. Later in the paper a study will be described of 35 countries for which in the
year 2000 the inter-country Gini coefficient was 0.515 while the global coefficient (the
distribution data being quintile income levels in each country) was 0.619. Since in
national GDP per head figures the very rich and the very poor are averaged into groups
poorer and richer than themselves respectively, the differences between inter-country
and global ratios of extremes tends to be much larger than those of Gini coefficients.
Since there is a widespread perception of a general tendency since 1980 towards
greater inequality within nations then it is possible that, if this is taken into account in
calculating world distribution, the results will be different. Theoretically changes in
internal distribution (including more inequality) do not have to mean that global
inequality is greater. Depending on how a country moves in the international income
hierarchy, an increase in its internal inequality can be consistent with either an increase
or a reduction in the global figure. Some of the studies to be reviewed later use
statistical measures which are capable of decomposing changes in global inequality into
between and within country effects. Nearly all of them concluding that in global
distribution the between country effects have far greater weight.
The most fundamental problem in calculating global inequality is the inadequacy of
national data about distribution. In particular very few long-term consistent series for
distribution exist. So global, as opposed to inter-country inequality can only be observed
over comparatively short periods, although Williamson has recently pioneered the use
of historical wage data to reach conclusions about changes in inequality (Williamson
14

and Lindert 2001).
Two methods have been used to try to assess the level and changes in global inequality
in recent decades. One is to begin with the national income data used in the intercountry calculations and apply to it available estimates of distribution thus deriving the
income per head of distributional groups (usually quintiles, occasionally deciles and
rarely smaller percentiles). These figures (weighted by the appropriate population
figures) are then pooled to calculate global inequality. The only attempt I have found to
do this for a long historical period has been the study by Bourguignon and Morrison for
the period 1910 to 1992. They use the Maddison 1995 income estimates weighted by
data on distribution from a variety of sources, some of it based largely on plausible
surmise. A recent study by Sala-i-Martin applies the same principle to a shorter time
period (1970–1998), using for income the estimates in PWT6.1 and for distribution the
Deininger–Squire database, to be discussed in the next section. Later I describe in
detail my own study using the same principle in which I apply the Deininger–Squire
distribution data to two sets of income data – the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators and Maddison 2001.
A recent study by Milanovic uses a second method. Instead of applying distribution data
to independently obtained income data as in the three studies mentioned above he
bases his whole analysis on household survey data which produce his distribution and
income figures simultaneously. The consequences of this different method are
discussed in section 8.
6. Different sources of distribution data
When it comes to comparisons over time and between countries the figures for GDP per
head are certainty itself compared with those for the distribution of income. While the
number of estimates for distribution is growing fast they are still much less
systematically available than those for GDP per capita. For very few countries are long
series available, and it is by no means certain that estimating methods in different
countries or at different dates are consistent with each other. The study of international
inequality has been given a big stimulus by the publication of the dataset produced by
Klaus Deininger and Lyn Squire at the World Bank and the WIDER International
Inequality Database (WIID) which takes the Deininger–Squire dataset as its basis.
Deininger and Squire produce two sets of data for the years 1950 to about 1995: the
total available and a reduced version of what they regard as the most reliable figures,
called high quality or “accept”. The criteria which they use for inclusion in this category
are: income or expenditure data covering the whole national population from national
household studies which use all income sources, including self-consumed production.
The application of these criteria seems to give some coherence to the whole data set.
But major reservations about its validity have been made by Atkinson and Brandolini
(2001) as part of a critique of large international “secondary” data sets in general. Those
authors point to significant inconsistencies between the Deininger and Squire highquality data and other, more intensively researched, sources of data on income
distribution in the OECD countries and, due to the use of different definitions at different
15

dates, they even conclude, using the case of the Netherlands as an example, that “it
would be highly misleading to regard the DS [Deininger–Squire] “accept” estimates as a
continuous series” (p. 780). If this is the case in a country where economic statistics are
highly developed, the situation must be even worse in the majority of countries where
they are not.
A perfectly understandable conclusion from the arguments of Atkinson and Brandolini,
and many other criticisms of inconsistencies and unreliability in international income and
distribution data, is that any attempt to calculate a figure for world distribution with
distribution data for many countries over a considerable time-period must be completely
unreliable and should perhaps be abandoned. Once data of this kind exists, however,
whatever its limitations, the temptation to analyse it to see what it implies is too great to
resist. The question of what is happening to distribution is too important for us to ignore
even the inadequate evidence which we may have about it. And drawing provisional
conclusions from the data we have, comparing them with other studies and observing
inconsistencies could help the task of improving the future quality of the data. While
Atkinson’s and Brandolini’s warnings are important, I have not let them stop me using
our inadequate data to explore tentative conclusions. About the past there is virtually no
hope that we shall ever have better data. So, as in the case of the income estimates, we
should use it in a spirit of great caution.
7. Inter-country studies compared
I now turn from the problems of method in studying world inequality to a comparison of
some of the studies which have been done, comparing the method, the data used,
aspects of the treatment, the results obtained and the significance of the conclusions.
This section discusses the results of inter-country studies and the next looks at global
studies.
The number of countries included in each study is affected by the dates and the type of
calculation. Inter-country studies require population and income per head figures for
each country. Maddison provides such information since 1900 for 49 countries (for most
of which the figures also go back to 1820). Unless extra estimates are made, centurylong studies are thus confined to these countries. For more recent dates more countries
can be included, using any of the three sources of estimates discussed above in section
5, namely the two versions of Maddison, various versions of PWT and the WDI. All
three now provide annual estimates of ppp income covering countries which contain
well over 90 percent of the world’s population.
7i. Long term studies
The time periods covered by all the studies surveyed in this and the next section range
from 98 years to five years. Both long and short term comparisons have alternative
disadvantages relating to the data. In the case of long term comparisons the quality and
completeness of the data is liable to change considerably over the period of the
comparison. And in the case of short term comparisons a change in apparent
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distribution may easily be within the margins of error of the data. For this reasons longterm comparisons must be treated with general caution; and short-term changes should
not be weighed very heavily.
There is no disagreement with the conclusion that during the twentieth century as a
whole the world’s distribution of income has become considerably more unequal.
Maddison’s 1995 data for 49 countries between 1900 and 1998 (as analysed by Boltho
and Toniolo) shows an overall rise in the Gini coefficient from 0.393 to 0.496.
Maddison’s data also show that this polarization between the richest and poorest
countries has been a characteristic of the period since 1820. Using the same data and
adding their own historical estimates of distribution changes Bourguignon and Morrison
in their global study produce a pattern of change of the long term evolution of the global
Gini coefficient which is broadly consistent with the Maddison 1995 inter-country
distribution. And other quantitative and qualitative data supports the conclusion that
current inequality is much greater than historical inequality (Williamson 1997, O’Rourke
2001). It seems that there is general agreement, based on the estimates available, that
the world’s countries became considerably more unequal between the Industrial
Revolution and at least the end of the great post-Second World War boom in about
1973.
7ii. Medium term studies
While the long-term conclusion is not challenged, a large amount of disagreement,
alluded to in section 2, has recently emerged on the question of what happened to world
distribution during the last two decades. This rapidly developing debate was partly
generated by the study in which Boltho and Toniolo calculated the long term Gini
coefficient from Maddison’s data. They showed that although inequality had grown
during the twentieth century as a whole it had, using the same data, distinctly fallen
since 1980, the Gini falling from 0.544 to 0.496 in 1998 (see Table 7, row 2).
How secure is the conclusion reached by Boltho and Toniolo? The first possible
problem with it is that, since their aim was to view changes in distribution over the whole
century, the calculations only contain the 49 countries which have the appropriate
figures for that period. What happens if more countries are included? I repeated the
same calculation based on World Bank GDP per head figures (ppp) for the 121
countries for which figures exist for the controversial shorter period from 1980 to 1998.
The inclusion of 72 more countries (many of them relatively poor countries) actually
reinforces the earlier conclusion: while the Gini has a higher value in 1980 it
nonetheless falls relatively slightly more up to 1998 (from 0.610 to 0.538, line 4). There
are two reservations to this conclusion: first that the effect of China is very great. If
China is excluded from the calculation then the Gini actually rises a little from 0.555 to
0.561 (line 5). And second, there are still many countries missing from the study for lack
of comparative ppp income per head figures. Since a number of these are very poor
countries which are known to have been become poorer in this period, then a complete
count might reduce the fall in the Gini.
Substituting the Penn World Tables data for the Maddison 1995 does not change the
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direction of the result. Summers and Heston find a slightly smaller fall in the Gini
between 1980 and 1990 (compare 1 and 2); their data (PWT5.6) at the time of writing
did not yet allow the calculation of the Gini beyond 1992. Firebaugh and Melchior and
Telle, both using PWT5.6 (in the latter case updated by the World Bank), both produce
fairly similar results (lines 3 and 6). My own calculation based on PWT6.1 also shows a
comparable fall in the Gini coefficient (line 7).
What does make a real difference to the inter-country estimates is using Maddison’s
more recent figures (Maddison 2001) instead of the earlier ones, used by Boltho and
Toniolo. The differences in the new series are: more countries are included (which
means especially including very poor countries previously omitted); the estimates for
many countries have been changed somewhat; and, most important, the estimates for
three countries – Japan, India and most importantly China – have been thoroughly
redone (see Maddison 1995, 1997 and 2001). Maddison’s new data shows the Gini
coefficient falling from 1973 to 1980, rising again from 1980 to 1990, and then falling
very slightly up to 1998. Once again the exclusion of China produces a noticeable
increase in the Gini for the rest of the world (lines 8 and 9).
Table 7: Inter-country Gini coefficients, 1950–1998 (also see Figure 2a)
Author and income data source
1. Summers & Heston (PWT 5.6)
2. Boltho & Toniolo (Maddison 95)
3. Firebaugh (PWT 5.6)
4. Author’s calculation (WDI 2002)
5.
as above omitting China
6. Melchior & Telle** (PWT 5.6 updated)
7. Author’s calculation (PWT 6)
8. Author’s calculation (Maddison 01)
9.
as above omitting China

1950

0.523
0.550

1973

0.59
0.591
0.573

1980
0.552
0.544
0.550
0.610
0.555
0.57
0.581
0.555
0.532

1990
0.547
0.526
*0.543
0.584
0.562
0.56
0.564
0.569
0.568

1998
n.a.
0.496
n.a.
0.538
0.561
0.52
0.519
0.564
0.582

* = 1989
** = figures approximate (read-off from graph)
Sources: see bibliography
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Figure 2a: Inter-country Gini coefficients, 1950–1998
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Figure 2b: Global Gini coefficients, 1980–2000
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The conclusion from comparing these calculations (all using ppp figures, but with
differing numbers of countries) is that the Maddison 1995 income estimates, the Penn
World Tables and the World Bank WDI figures give consistent results, all showing either
a slightly or moderately declining Gini coefficient, in other words less inter-country
inequality, during the two decades following 1980. The exception is the revised
Maddison 2001 income estimates. These produce a slightly fluctuating Gini coefficient.
The key changes in Maddison’s data have been revisions of the figures for China and
the fact that he has ventured to include indirect estimates for more countries than
appear in the World Bank figures. The inclusion of two kinds of countries for which the
World Bank does not estimate have the effect of changing the calculated trend towards
less inequality: these are very rich countries (mostly oil producing) which experienced
major falls in income per head during this period and a number of poor countries which
experienced disastrous social situations (often civil wars) which led to declines in
already very low income levels. While most of these calculations include a large majority
of the world’s population, the omitted minority cannot be assumed to follow roughly the
same pattern. The countries included in fact may make a significant difference to the
results.
Evidently no calculation of the world’s income distribution can be performed without the
inclusion of its most populous country, China. There are, however, two reasons why
doing the calculations omitting China (as has been done in the above table for the
World Bank and the Maddison 2001 figures) may be of some interest. The first is that
since China has a disproportionate influence on the world figures which it is interesting
to abstract from and the second is that there is considerable controversy about the
correctness of different series for China’s GDP over the years since the economic
reform. The result suggests that the movement of Chinese national income, whatever
the estimate, has had the effect of reducing inter-country inequality, as indicated by the
Gini coefficient. The same point is discussed by Melchior (2001) and Schultz (1998).
I have also calculated various ratios of extremes using WDI (ppp) figures and
Maddison’s 2001 study several ratios of extremes. The results are shown in Table 8.
The 50/50 ratio according to Maddison’s figures and the 20/20 ratio according to both
these estimates became less unequal during the whole period. But the 10/10 ratio
behaved very differently. In the case of the World Bank figures it declined in the first
decade but then becomes more unequal again in the second, leaving it at about the
same level as it started. But according to Maddison’s income estimates the difference
was much more significant: the 10/10 ratio showed a strong increase in inequality at the
extremes.
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Table 8: Inter-country ratios of extremes 1980–1998
Richest/poorest 50% WDI
Richest/poorest 20% WDI
Richest/poorest 10% WDI
Richest/poorest 5% WDI

1980
10.91
26.68
27.94
29.01

Richest/poorest 50% Maddison 2001
8.35
Richest/poorest 20% Maddison 2001
16.82
Richest/poorest 10% Maddison 2001
23.09
Richest/poorest 5% Maddison 2001
30.03
Source: author’s calculations from World Bank 2002 and Maddison 2001

1990
7.37
15.94
23.54
31.73

1998
5.27
14.81
25.75
39.91

6.55
28.19
34.62
45.40

5.49
18.58
40.01
61.14

Figure 3: Ratios of extremes, 1990–2000
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2002, online version

A similar result (using Penn World Tables figures updated by the World Bank) was
obtained by Melchior (2000). And Figure 3, using annual calculations based on WDI,
shows the divergence in the behaviour of the 20/20 ratio which slowly declines while the
10/10 ratio appreciably falls during the 1990s then very slowly begins to rise again.
Looking at all of these figures together, therefore, begins to suggest that to say that
inter-country inequality in the last two decades of the 20th century either fell of was on a
‘plateau’ (Firebaugh 1999) or ‘was roughly stable’ (Bourguinon and Morrison 2001) is
too simple. As well as being affected by the number of countries included and by the
source of the income data, the overall conclusion about inequality depends on the
statistic which is used to measure it. The contrast between the integral measure and the
ratio of extremes suggests anything but stability or constancy. It looks more as if there
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were strong equalising forces in the middle sections of the distribution (which influence
the Gini coefficient) combined with equally strong disequalizing ones at the extremes.
There will be more evidence of this when we move to look at global, as opposed to
inter-country, inequality.
8. Global studies compared
Of the four global studies, three apply distribution estimates to independently obtained
income estimates and the fourth (that of Milanovic) derives both distribution and income
at the same time from World Bank household surveys. While some of the studies use
various statistics to test changes in inequality, I have restricted comparisons to the Gini
coefficient. Partly this is to save space and simplify the argument. But also it is because
none of the alternative measures used by other authors substantially changes the
conclusions of any of their studies, although it sometimes allows them to be more
sophisticated.
Bourguignon and Morrison’s estimates based on Maddison’s 1995 income figures and
various sources for distribution have already been mentioned. For the period after 1980
they provide only two observations, thirteen years apart. They are identical and lead the
authors to argue that overall inequality has been stable in the recent period. Sala-iMartin uses PWT6.1 income figures and the Deininger–Squire database for distribution.
He produces annual figures by deriving trend lines for the distribution data. If there is
only one estimate of distribution then he applies it through the whole period. He
concludes that from 1980 there has been a significant downward reduction in inequality,
the Gini coefficient falling from 0.662 to 0.633 between 1980 and 1998.
My own calculations, which are described in detail in the following section of the paper,
were done in a way similar in principle to Sala-i-Martin’s, though they are statistically
much less intricate. They involve applying distribution estimates from the DeiningerSquire high quality dataset to two different income estimates: the World Bank WDI data
and Maddison’s 2001 data. Each of these two calculations was done with two sets of
countries: a pure set of 35 countries in which a distribution estimate existed for all three
years compared (or a year fairly close; see Appendix) and a second much larger hybrid
set of countries some with very incomplete, sometimes non-existent, distribution figures.
The exact methods are set out in the next section.
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Table 9: Values of Gini coefficients in global studies (also see Figure 2b)
Authors (income, distribution)
1. Bourguignon/Morrison
(Maddison 95, various)
2. Sala-i-Martin (PWT 6, D/S)
3. Milanovic (Household surveys)
4. Sutcliffe pure (WDI 2002, D/S)
5. Sutcliffe pure (Maddison 01, D/S)
6. Sutcliffe hybrid (WDI 2002, D/S)
7. Sutcliffe hybrid (Maddison 01,
D/S)

1970

1975

1980

1985

1988

1990

0.657
0.657

0.661

0.662

1993

1995

1998

0.635

0.633

2000

0.657
0.650

0.654
0.628

0.66

0.697
0.661
0.667

0.658
0.636
0.650

0.617

0.619

0.638

0.633

0.628

0.627

Sources: see bibliography and section 9 of this paper. D/S = Deininger/Squire

As in the case of the inter-country studies all the estimates based on PWT6.1 and WDI
(Table 9, rows 2,4 and 6), income data show an appreciable fall in inequality between
1980 and 1998/2000. The Bourguignon and Morrison estimate (1) based on Maddison
95 shows no change. My own (5,7), based on Maddison 01, shows an appreciable fall
in the case of the pure study but very little change when a lot more countries are
included. There seem to be two reasons for these differences: the number of countries
included and the actual estimates. As mentioned in relation to the inter-country studies,
Maddison in producing the latest version of his income study made major changes to
his earlier estimates for a number of important countries, especially India and China,
and these materially affect the outcome. He also took particular pains to include
estimates (often not direct ones) of all countries and territories, including very small
countries and countries for which the World Bank for example does not give estimates
because of the virtual breakdown of government statistical services due to states of war
and other causes. This means that Maddison includes more of the countries which have
fared worst in recent decades, as well as a few very rich (oil producing and tax haven)
countries which are also left out of other datasets. This is not to say that the estimates
for these countries are necessarily very accurate but their inclusion makes the dataset
particularly satisfactory for capturing a more inclusive image of global distribution. The
result is that Maddison’s data shows the global Gini coefficient falling only very slightly
from 0.638 to 0.628 during the years 1980 to 1998 and, as already seen in the previous
section, shows inter-country inequality virtually static. The combined effect of all these
studies is to erode somewhat, but by no means entirely, the earlier impression of a
sharp fall in inequality during this period.
The other global study, by Milanovic (3), produces a very different result, a rise in the
Gini coefficient over a period of 5 years. His method is to begin not with aggregate
national income estimates but with detailed household income or consumption survey
data. Distribution and income data are thereby obtained together. It is, as he says, a
much more natural way to conduct a study of global distribution than the two stage
methods used by others. Such data has been collected for a number of years by the
World Bank in their household surveys and Branko Milanovic has used these to
calculate what he calls the first ‘true’ measure of global inequality (Milanovic 2002). His
study is remarkable not only for its pioneering methodology but for the fact that, unlike
most of the other studies so far reviewed it concludes that the global Gini coefficient
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(and other measures of inequality) has been rising fast in exactly the period during
which other writers have concluded that it has been falling or steady. Another study by
Nikhanov and Ward (2001), using the same household distribution data as Milanovic
reaches an almost identical conclusion.
Interesting and innovative as it is, Milanovic’s study has a number of limitations. The
first is that it covers a very brief time span (1988 and 1993) which makes it impossible to
draw from it a conclusion even about the two decades from 1980. The dates have been
chosen because they were benchmark years for international price level comparisons
(used in the production of ppp income and consumption data). But the dates of the
household surveys do not always correspond to these years. Sometimes they related to
nearby years which means that for a study based on two years which are only five years
apart the range of years used in the surveys can overlap. The figures for 1988 are
based on surveys made between 1980 and 1991 and those for 1993 on surveys made
between 1990 and 1998. This limitation can be partly answered by saying that,
assuming that changes in national distributions have generally moved in one direction,
the observed rise in the global Gini coefficient suggests a general tendency towards
rising global inequality between the 1980s and 1990s. But this problem nonetheless
means that, despite its interesting conclusion, the study does not provide a definitive
answer to the question of what happened to global distribution during the last two
decades.
Milanovic decomposes the influences on overall global inequality into inter-country and
intra-country components. He finds, like almost all others who have used such a
technique, that the vast majority of global inequality is accounted for by differences
between and not within countries. But his conclusion that growing inter-country
differences are the main cause of the rise of the Gini coefficient over the five years of
his study, seems in this case a rather eccentric one since he emphases the special
contribution of the growth in rural/urban inequality in both China and India but he treats
the rural and urban sectors in both cases as two separate “countries”.
The studies which use the two stage methodology (starting with national income or
product per head and then using quintile distribution data to produce income per head
or quintile groups) give fairly consistent results while the one-stage method used by
Milanovic (using household surveys directly to calculate income and distribution) gives a
contrasting result. It is possible that this difference may be explained by the difference in
method. Milanovic discusses why the two methods might be expected to give different
results. But what he does not explain is why for 1988 his method produces a Gini
coefficient which is (implicitly) slightly lower than any of those produced by the two
stage method while for 1993 it produces one which is higher. It is not clear why the
factors which can cause a two stage method to produce a different result from the one
stage method should have changed over this five-year period so as to produce this
reversal.
The final problem with Milanovic’s study is that the comparability and reliability of
household surveys may be no better than the comparability and reliability of the other
statistics used in all the studies quoted. And, unlike the case of two-stage studies which
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use ppp estimates of product or income per head, there is in the case of the World Bank
household studies only one source. This is not meant as a reservation about Milanovic’s
study in particular since in the end all studies of global equality depend on data of
questionable reliability and many of them end up by using estimates of intra-country
inequalities which are at least in part derived from the same World Bank household
surveys used by Milanovic. But the difference between conclusions reached by his
method and those produced by other methods (even where the underlying data are
partly the same) does underline the importance of further work on comparing and
improving data on income and distribution.
I am not, however, suggesting that no work is valid until the data improves. Rather that
the problems of data mean that differing results arise due to differences in both data
and method and that these cannot be considered definitive conclusions but rather
hypotheses for which further support needs to be sought.
9. Two additional calculations, 1980–2000
I have carried out two additional calculations for the three years 1980, 1990 and
1998/2000, some of the results of which were already set out in the previous section but
which are here described in detail. These are sufficiently different in method, data
selected and results to make it worth describing them and comparing them to the other
calculations mentioned above. I have calculated global values for both ratios of
extremes and Gini coefficients, and the most interesting conclusion is the different
pictures which emerge from comparing these measures. The income data used was
taken both from the World Bank’s WDI and from Maddison 01 and so allow a direct
comparison of the differences resulting from using different data sources. Quintile
distribution figures are from the Deininger–Squire distribution dataset supplemented for
more recent years by the table on distribution which appears in World Development
Indicators 2002 (book).
The two calculations use these same sources but treat them differently. The first (which
I call the pure study) includes only those countries which have values for GDP (ppp) per
head and estimates of inter-quintile distribution in each of the three years; no extra data
has been extrapolated. The ideal country for the sample was one with figures for quintile
shares in 1980, 1990 and 1998 (the most recent year possible). This strong stipulation
means, of course, that the number of countries for which all this data is available in the
cited sources is very limited; only 5 countries fulfilled these criteria. So countries were
included if they had observations for inter-quintile distribution in years close to the three
benchmark years. I had to be quite generous in interpreting this rule (as can be seen in
the appendix note) in order to include 35 countries which accounted for 70% of the
world population in 1980 and 1990 and 69% in 2000 and for a share of world GDP
which rises from 61 percent in 1980 to 67 percent in 2000. The means that collectively
the 35 countries have a lower than world average GDP per head but that they have
improved relative to the world average during the years studied.
The second calculation (which I call the hybrid study) is based on the same data
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sources but extrapolates values where they do not exist in order to maximise the
number of countries which included. The two changes made were:
a. where GDP per head figures were lacking for one or more of the years in the WDI
dataset they were interpolated using one of two methods. In some cases the country
was assumed to have the same relationship to the average for its continent as the
nearest year in which a GDP per head estimate is available, except in specific cases
where the same ratio was assumed to be maintained between the country lacking data
and some other individual country (Mongolia with the Russian Federation; and Oman,
Qatar and Kuwait with Saudi Arabia).
b. the distribution data was extrapolated by assuming that, when not available for a
particular year, inter-quintile distribution remained the same as in the previous available
year. Where no distribution data at all are available each quintile of the population is
allocated one fifth of the income (i.e. total equality is assumed). Hence no assumptions
have been made about what distribution might be or about how it might have moved.
Missing estimates are all supplied by applying these simple rules and not by efforts to
divine what happened.
These procedures allow the number of countries in the sample to be increased from 35
to 163 containing about 96 percent of world population. Of the extra 128 countries 4
(Mongolia, Oman, Qatar and Kuwait) are added due to the provision of an income
estimate and the other 124 due to the addition of figures for inter-quintile distribution. A
few countries had to be left out altogether since no comparable data exists at all on
either ppp income or on distribution; these were Barbados, all the countries of former
Yugoslavia, Cuba, Cambodia, Laos, Rwanda, Djibouti and Liberia.
Table 10: Results of the ‘pure’ study
Using WDI 2002 figures
1980
Global Gini coefficient
Richest/poorest 50%
Richest/poorest 20%
Richest/poorest 10%

1990

2000

0.6977
12.6
42.2
74.6

0.6582
9.5
30.4
69.9

0.6192
8.0
24.5
47.7

1980
0.6607
9.9
40.0
54.4

1990
0.6359
8.37
25.8
51.1

1998
0.6173
7.9
25.2
48.7

Using Maddison 2001 GDP figures
Global Gini coefficient
Richest/poorest 50%
Richest/poorest 20%
Richest/poorest 10%

Source: author’s calculations based on World Bank 2002a and 2002b and Maddison 2001
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In the pure study (Table 10) the percentage fall in the global Gini coefficient for the
global figure in the case of both income sources is in fact proportionately greater than
the fall for the inter-country figure in the Boltho and Toniolo calculation using Maddison
95. For this sample of countries the inter-country Gini falls by much more that the Boltho
and Toniolo figure. But in 1998 the global Gini, according to this calculation, is still
higher than for any single country in the world with the exception of Sierra Leone (World
Bank 2002). Once again Maddison 01 figures produce a smaller decline in inequality
than the WDI 2002 figures. The almost total exclusion due to lack of data of SubSaharan African countries from this pure study must make a significant difference to the
level and trend of the Ginis.
Table 11: Results of the hybrid study
Using WDI 2002 figures
Gini coefficient
Richest/poorest 50%
Richest/poorest 20%
Richest/poorest 10%
Richest/poorest 5%
Richest/poorest 1%

1980
0.6667
13.62
45.73
78.86
120.75
216.17

1990
0.6504
10.21
33.85
64.21
101.02
275.73

2000
0.6272
8.83
29.49
57.41
116.41
414.57

1980
0.6385
10.4
33.0
58.2
139.4
214.3

1990
0.6331
9.1
30.5
54.9
98.6
290.6

1998
0.6285
8.9
23.1
61.1
123.1
359.6

Using Maddison 2001 figures
Gini coefficient
Richest/poorest 50%
Richest/poorest 20%
Richest/poorest 10%
Richest/poorest 5%
Richest/poorest 1%
Source: see Table 10

The results point to a growing gap between global and inter-country Ginis, suggesting
that an increasing share of inequality between the inhabitants of the world is caused by
internal rather than inter-country inequalities. A similar conclusion is reached by
Bourguignon and Morrison and several other writers.
The hybrid study (Table 11) in effect adds data on inter-national distribution for 128
countries to the global data for 35 countries in the pure study. Perhaps surprisingly
(since many African countries are now included) the overall Gini coefficient, for both
income sources, is slightly lower in 1980 than that of the pure study. But, although it still
registers a decline during the 18 years, the fall is very much less than in the pure study
or in the inter-country Gini calculated using Maddison’s 1995 data. Maddison 01
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produces a falling Gini coefficient but the fall is much smaller than that shown by the
WDI data. More surprisingly in the case of the WDI figures there is a rather considerable
decline in the 20/20 and 10/10 ratios. The latter is particularly surprising given that, as
observed above, there is some evidence from other sources of an increase in inequality
according to this statistic during the 1990s. But, if even smaller extremes are compared,
the result does change and rather dramatically. The 5/5 ratio falls during the 1980s and
then rises during the 1990s. Using the Maddison 01 figures this occurs for both the
10/10 ratio as well. And in the case of both data sources there is an enormous increase
in the ratio of the income of the richest to that of the poorest 1 per cent of the world’s
population, in other words about 60 million people at each end of the distribution. This
ratio has very nearly doubled over the two decades studied.
From all the above global data, as in the case of the inter-country calculations, what
seems to emerge is that within a decline or stabilization of inequality in one sense there
is a growth of inequality in other senses. First, a small group at the top of the distribution
has been separating itself off from the rest of the world distribution, and another group
at the bottom have been suffering increasingly extreme privation, producing the ratios of
extremes we have just seen. The largest component of the top group is the top quintile
of the United States population. I suspect that the tendency would be even more
marked if the internal quantiles were more detailed than the simple quintiles used in this
study. Here, then, is evidence from another source of an extraordinary rise in income
accruing to characters such as the CEOs of big companies, the “ultra high wealth
individuals” and others whom we met in the first section of this paper and whose wealth,
as well as their crimes and misdemeanours, came during 2002 to occupy a growing
proportion of media and even government attention. In a second sense, too, inequalities
between particular countries, continents or country groups are growing even when
overall measures of world inequality show stability or decrease. A number of these
cases will be looked at in the next section. Thirdly, even if there has been a recent
decline in measured overall global and inter-country inequality, this cannot be
interpreted as a sustainable trend. Sala-i-Martin is one of those who insists on the
recent existence of declining inequality; nonetheless he adds the extremely important
rider that, if the demographic and economic growth trends between and within countries
which have existed for the last 20 years continue with no change, then they will before
long lead to a renewal of the long-term increase in world inequality which characterized
most of the twentieth century.
10. More disaggregated measures
Measures of world inequality are the net outcome of rises and falls of relative income for
thousands of different groups of the world’s inhabitants; we can perhaps, therefore,
conclude more about the way in which inequality has changed by looking at more
disaggregated measures. Although the number of countries for which internal
distribution data are available over time is limited we can take countries in different parts
of the world and see how they fared in relation to each other. That is done in Table12
which shows the ratio of the top 10 percent of the population of the United States to the
bottom 10 percent of the population in four large countries, Brazil, China, India and
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Nigeria in 1980 and 1990 and 2000.
Table 12: Ratio of income per head of the richest US quintile relative to the
poorest quintile in four poorer countries (income calculated in ppp dollars)
Country
Year
1980
1990
2000

Brazil
46
75
94

China

India

157
106
67

Nigeria

96
79
83

152
215
402

Note: for all countries the income figures for the years specified are used in combination with internal
distribution figures for the nearest available year (see Appendix note).
Sources: World Bank 2002a and 2002b (for income in all three years and for distribution in latest year);
Deininger and Squire 1996 (for distribution in 1980 and 1990)

These figures show that the poor in China have become somewhat less poor in relation
to the rich of the United States during the last two decades, the poor of India have
fluctuated and are now marginally less relatively poor; the poor of Brazil are twice as
relatively poor as in 1980 and those of Nigeria between two and three times as relatively
poor. Whatever the overall single measures of distribution show, these figures
dramatically underline how behind global figures is a complex and contradictory process
of convergence and divergence. It is worth noting that, on the same method of
calculation between 1990 and 2000 the highest quintile in China overtook the lowest
quintile of the United States in level of income per head.
The same process is illustrated by the evolution of the income of the richest United
States quintile and the world mean and median income, shown in Table 13. The data for
this is identical to that used in the hybrid study (see Section 10).
Table 13: Relation of the top United States incomes to the world median and mean
1980
US top quintile/world median
US top quintile/world mean
World mean/world median

1990
34
8.5
4.0

2000
31
9.5
3.3

26
10.5
2.5

Source: see Table 13

11. Agreements and disagreements
The above comparisons of various studies, using different methodology and data, lead
to a number of tentative conclusions. First, several estimates, using partially differing
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data and methods, all place the global Gini coefficient in the 1990 as about 0.65 or a
little below. It is possible that that is not a coincidence but approximates to its real value.
If so, then it allows the conclusion that the distribution of income among the world’s
population is more unequal than for any individual country, even Brazil or South Africa
which are symbols of inequality.
Second, in relation to trend, the estimates of Milanovic seem to show a very different
picture from the others, though no exact comparison is possible. While the years
compared are not the same, this study in finding a sharp increase in global inequality
between 1988 and 1993 seem to be quite inconsistent with my calculation and that of
Bourguignon and Morrison, although the latter authors rather inexplicably say that they
regard the Milanovic study as consistent with theirs. But if they are incompatible, as I
suspect, the reason for the difference must be the difference in the data. Milanovic and
Dikhanov and Ward use the World Bank’s data set on household spending while
Bourguignon and Morrison, Sala-i-Martin and I use estimates of GDP per head,
weighted by distribution estimates. If it is indeed this difference in income data which
produces such apparently radically different results, then the debate about calculated
results should obviously be replaced by a much more detailed one about the validity of
these household spending estimates as compared with GDP estimates (a question
which Milanovic addresses in his article (2002)). One obvious question relating to this is
that of government income and spending. Total household spending will necessarily be
less than total national income and a major source of the difference will be government
spending. If government spending is inegalitarian then the GDP figures will
underestimate the degree of inequality; if it is egalitarian then the calculations based on
household spending will exaggerate the degree of inequality. Until this kind of question
has been resolved the present disagreements between different economists about the
trend of global inequality in the last 20 years cannot resolve very much. The differences
are really differences about the data and its appropriateness.
Third, the studies present a range of different outcomes for the last two decades of the
twentieth century. Together they cast doubt on the idea that inequality has sharply and
unambiguously declined during the epoch of neoliberalism. Nor do they seem to offer
comfort to those who claim that it has sharply and unambiguously increased.
Fourth, it is striking that the most recent version of Maddison’s widely used historical
income estimates does not show the considerable decline in the Gini coefficient which
was noted in the earlier version. In fact, in the whole world excluding China, there was a
substantial rise in the Gini coefficient between 1980 and 1998 (which does not show up
using PWT or World Bank ppp figures). This implies, in the case of Maddison, that the
changes in income in China over these two decades have been a powerful producer of
greater equality on a world scale, in spite of the fact that they have produced more
inequality in China. This conclusion is doubly ironic when compared with that of
Milanovic. He emphasises that growing inequality between rural and urban China
(which he includes as two separate countries in his calculations) is one of the main
factors which between 1988 and 1993 produced a sharp increase in global inequality.
There is a major contradiction implicit in all this which would merit some further
research.
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Fifth, calculations based on ppp estimates give lower estimates of inequality and show
slower growth of inequality than estimates which convert national incomes using
exchange rates. I have given data in exchange rate based-comparisons only for
comparative purposes because they are so widely quoted. In my opinion an estimate of
world distribution, inter-national or global, in exchange rate terms is in principle
meaningless and should never be done. To give an example: between 1999 and 2001
the Euro/US Dollar exchange rate fell by around 30 percent. Does that mean that US
real incomes have risen 30 percent compared with European real incomes? Evidently
not. Calculations in exchange rate terms should really be banished from this debate. But
they will persist because they fuel conclusions which many people want to reach. This is
not to say that ppp estimates are anywhere near perfect. They have many defects.
Different sources provide widely different estimates and they can only be produced by
devoting a large quantity of resources to the necessary price surveys. But at least they
provide in principle a coherent basis of comparison. We cannot say as much of
exchange rate based estimates, especially in a world of greater exchange rate
instability.
Sixth, my own calculations suggest that inequality is growing between the extremes of
rich and poor while the intermediate sections of the world population move close
together (see section 9). This result is consistent with a similar one produced by
Melchior (2001) using annual inter-country income data.
Seventh, in comparing all these results an important debate has emerged about
whether the world is characterised increasingly by a bi-modal or a uni-modal
distribution. Quah has argued that what has been emerging is a “twin-peaks” form of
distribution. Milanovic (2002b) also concludes that we are approaching a “world without
a middle class”. Applying to the world the rule of thumb that the middle class is
statistically defined as those with between 75 and 125 percent of the median income he
calculates than only 14.5 percent of the population belong to it. According to Maddison’s
figures it was only about 12 percent in 1998, scarcely changed since 1980. By contrast,
Sala-i-Martin concludes that the situation is one of “vanishing twin-peaks” and
“emergence of a world middle class”. Not only is this difference important in relation to
interpreting the statistics, but also it is relevant to the kind of class structure a more
globalized capitalist world is assuming, and this would, of course, have many
implications for future political development. There is plenty of scope for more work and
debate on this issue both on the statistical and the political plane.
12. Ironies of the debate
The end of the twentieth century has produced a spate of economic assessments of it
by scholars and by international institutions. While there is much agreement, except
among ecological economists, that the century has been extraordinarily successful in
terms of increased productivity and output, there is more doubt about the question of
distribution. Many are worried that it has been a century of divergence rather than
convergence. The fact that the gap between the incomes per head of countries has
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widened during the century has been observed in reports from the UNDP, the OECD,
the IMF, the World Bank and other institutions and publications.
A little over a decade ago the UNDP began to denounce the use of conventional
national income per head figures as an appropriate measure of development. In
inventing its influential Human Development Index it argued that income per head
should be converted at purchasing power parity not with exchange rates, that its value
should be sharply attenuated (by using its logarithm rather than actual value) and that it
should be only one third of an index of development, the other two thirds being life
expectancy and education. This index, however, produces a world in which countries
are considerably more quantitatively equal than when they are compared using
conventional income per head. And a recent study has shown that over the long period,
during which they have diverged according to income per head, they have converged
according to the HDI (Crafts 2000). Bourguignon and Morrison also look not only at the
long-term divergence of distribution of income but also at the convergence of the
distribution of years of life. On this variable only inter-country data are available. But like
income, life expectancy is unequally distributed within national populations (Sutcliffe
2001) although there is generally still very little data about this.
During the 1990s the UNDP continues to publish the HDI but puts growing
propagandistic importance on measures of world inequality during the last 30 years
based on figures which its reports (and most economists) had previously claimed was
inappropriate – namely income per head converted into dollars using the current
exchange rate. These, of course, showed sharply increasing income inequality and the
UNDP’s claims on this subject have been central to the spread of this idea. This irony
has recently been compounded since in the late 1990s the relation between exchange
rate conversions and ppp measures went partially into reverse. For example, between
1995 and 2000, due to a reverse in exchange rate trends, the ratio of the richest to the
poorest 10 percent of the population (based on population-weighted inter-country
figures) fell for the exchange rate comparison and rose for the ppp based comparison,
the opposite of the relation which had existed in previous years and which had been
exploited by those who wished to overstate inequality.
At the turn of the century the IMF, disturbed that its upbeat assessment of the twentieth
century was tainted by the rise in inequality, suddenly discovered in the 2000 issue of its
Global Economic Outlook that maybe income is not the most important measure of
welfare and that the Human Development Index may be a better measure to use.
The UNDP and many other participants in the debate (some of them innocently) make
liberal use of statistics which almost everyone (including themselves) otherwise reject
as seriously misleading measures of comparative welfare of development, only, it
seems, because they show inequality which is quantitatively greater and growing faster.
The UNDP have been criticised for it by members of the UN Statistical Commission.
And the IMF extols the convergence suggested by the HDI without mentioning that,
because of the way in which the index is constructed (with a maximum attainable level
and based on variables which have upper limits which most developed countries are
close to), it is almost bound to show convergence. In the HDI all progress, however slow
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or rapid, expresses itself as convergence. The important discussion of world inequality
therefore is being seriously harmed by uncritical and opportunistic use of statistics by
these organizations.
The tendency to choose the figures which best suit one’s conclusions is, of course, not
confined to international bureaucracies. The reason for the extraordinary diffusion of the
exchange rate based estimates of international distribution is that they seem to support
already reached conclusions, especially that neoliberalism and globalization
considerably worsen the distribution of income. The recent tendencies of global
distribution are clearly difficult to establish and depend very much on the insufficiently
discussed quality of different types of data. But the change in inequality over the last
few decades is a comparatively trivial question compared with the actual degree of that
inequality during all of the modern period. Inequality in the distribution of income in the
world in the modern epoch as a whole is higher than in any previous period of world
history; and it is greater than the inequality which exists in any single one of the world’s
component countries. Those are the important and undeniable facts. Those of us who
believe that this is a manifestation of massive social injustice should not automatically
deny all evidence of lessening inequality because it might weaken our argument. We
should be concerned to arrive at the best and most coherent numerical estimates,
whatever those may show. Unfortunately, we can be safe in the knowledge that an
egalitarian world is not at hand.
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Appendix note
Countries in my “pure” study with exact dates of distribution estimates:
First year
Second year
Third year
Australia
79
90
94
Bangladesh
78
86
95/6
Brazil
80
89
98
Bulgaria
80
90
97
Canada
79
90
94
China
80
90
98
Colombia
78
88
96
Costa Rica
81
89
97
Czech Rep/Czecho.
80
88
96
Dominican Rep
84
89
98
France
79
84
95
Greece
81
88
93
Hungary
77
89
98
India
77
90
97
Indonesia
80
90
99
Italy
80
89
95
Jamaica
75
90
00
Jordan
80
91
97
Korea Rep (South)
80
88
93
Malaysia
79
89
97
Mexico
77
89
98
Morocco
84
91
98/9
Netherlands
79
91
94
Nigeria
86
92
96/7
Norway
79
91
95
Pakistan
79
88
96/7
Panama
79
89
97
Poland
80
90
98
Portugal
80
90
94/5
Russian Fed/USSR
80
89
98
Sri Lanka
80
90
95
Thailand
75
90
98
Turkey
73
87
94
USA
80
90
97
Venezuela
79
90
98
Share of world pop
Share of world GDP

70
61

70
63

69
67

Sources: Deininger and Squire, World Bank 2002b
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